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PREFACE
Two earlier monographs in this series by General Gordon R.
Sullivan and Colonel James M. Dubik, Land Warfare in the 21st
Century and War in the Information Age, provided a general
concept of what land warfare might portend in the post-Cold War
and post-Information Age environment. This monograph, by General
Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony M. Coroalles, brings into
focus several areas where the future will differ most from the
past. They provide insights into three critical areas: the
operational environment; the emergence of simultaneity as a
unifying concept in Information Age warfare; and, changes that
must take place in the planning environment.
When history is at a watershed, people, institutions, and
nations have three choices. One choice is to live in the past;
relishing triumphs, elaborating on myths, and eventually becoming
a part of the past. The second choice is to fight change. Indeed,
all change is not for the better. In times of uncertainty, like
those the Army faces today, individuals, institutions, and
nations are susceptible to what can be facile, transitory, and
faddish. The Army would do well to recall the "pentomic
divisions" plan of 1956. The third alternative is for
individuals, institutions and nations to embrace the future with
all of its uncertainties. It is better to transform rather than
to be transformed by the future.
Uncertainty will be the norm as the Army moves into the 21st
century. During the Cold War, the Army was ready to fight a
particular kind of conflict. Today, when conditions are less
certain and the threats more ambiguous, unpredictable, and in a
sense more likely to be translated into acts of force to achieve
political, economic, or terroristic objectives, the Army must be
structured, trained, equipped, and prepared for maximum
flexibility. The authors suggest that the challenge today is to
determine what array of capabilities may be needed to perform a
broader range of requirements and to decide how much of each
capability Force XXI will need.
The Army has one tremendous resource as it faces the 21st
century: soldiers that can think. They constitute more than a
half million smart weapons in the Army inventory. Each one can
make decisions under adverse conditions, track on multiple
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targets, fire and forget, and each one possesses a virtually
unlimited reloading capability. Because each one also can make
moral choices, they are individually more precious than any
number of Comanche helicopters, multiple launch rocket systems,
or counter-battery radars. That is why, as we address the
challenges of the present while articulating a vision for the
21st century, we must be very careful to consult history, the

iv

only reliable guide we have for addressing the future for the
wisdom it offers.

EARL H. TILFORD, JR.
Director of Studies
Strategic Studies Institute
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THE ARMY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

May you live in interesting times.
Old Chinese Curse
Introduction.
Times of change, times of turbulence, and times of
uncertainty are inherently "interesting" periods. The element
that makes them so is unpredictability. Unpredictability also
compels many people, including military professionals, to fear
and to want to avoid such times. Certainty, stability, and calm
are conditions that we find much easier to deal with in our daily
lives. Given a choice, these are also the conditions that most
nations and institutions would prefer as characteristic of their
strategic environment. Yet neither the Army nor the nation seem
to have a choice in the rapid pace of change that is swirling
around us as the 20th century draws to a close. Indeed we live in
interesting times.
Two powerful conditions define the environment in which the
United States Army operates today: the collapse of the Cold War
strategic environment and the dawning of what futurists Alvin and
1
Heidi Toffler have described as the "Information Age." In
November 1989 the Berlin Wall came down, and with it tumbled the
central strategic focus of the United States. From the end of the
Second World War until the collapse of communism in Central and
Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, our world view had been
filtered through the lens of the Cold War confrontation between
the United States and the Soviet Union; a stable and certain
strategic focus. From 1948, when American and Allied forces stood
firm during the Soviet blockade of Berlin, and simultaneously
showed their determination over Greece, the United States and the
Soviet Union were locked in a worldwide, political, economic,
military, and ideological struggle; a struggle we correctly
perceived as a life-or-death contest between diametrically
opposed socio-political, economic, and ideological systems. The
U.S. Army went to war in Korea in 1950 and American troops faced
off with Soviet and East German soldiers at Checkpoint Charlie
during the Berlin crisis in the summer of 1961. The armed forces
of this nation stood ready for what might have been the final
conflagration as the John F. Kennedy administration stared down
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Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro during the Cuban Missile
Crisis of October 1962. The Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines
fought a long and bitter war against communist insurgents and
North Vietnamese aggression in Indochina in the 1960s and into
2
the 1970s. In the 1980s, Washington supported resistance forces
in Nicaragua and Afghanistan while standing by our traditional
allies in NATO and our friends in the Middle East. All of this
was done under the rubric of containment with one goal in mind:
to stop the spread of Soviet communism. The Cold War was
America's third most costly war; 100,000 Americans gave their
lives in this effort.
Ultimately, we prevailed. Not only was Soviet communism
contained, but Germany and the countries of Eastern and Central
Europe were freed from the yoke of communism. Today freedom is
growing in these countries and, however delicately and
precariously, growing in a democratic Russia.
Throughout this 40-year conflict, our Army trained and
prepared for global war against the Soviet Union. Army doctrine,
organizations, and equipment reflected this reality. Physically
and psychologically the Army was oriented to our biggest threat–a
Soviet and Warsaw Pact attack into Western Europe. By November of
1989, the Army had 28 Divisions, 18 in the Active Component and
10 in the Reserves. Of these, 24 were committed, in one way or
another, to fighting a war in Europe. The others were apportioned
to the fight in other theaters against the Soviets or their
surrogates and allies. Thus in November of 1989, after years of
preparation for a war that never happened–precisely because we
were prepared for it–we found ourselves the victors in Europe and
the heirs to a new strategic environment which we are just now
beginning to understand.
Today, as we articulate a vision for the Army of the 21st
century, Force XXI, rapid technological developments in
information management and processing are ushering in what many
believe to be the beginning of a post-industrial age; the
Information Age. The microprocessor is revolutionizing the way
that we live our lives as individuals, the way that society
functions, and the way that we are likely to fight our future
wars. Just as coal and steam, and petroleum and electricity made
possible the mass production of goods and the emergence of
industrial society by supplementing muscle power with machine
power, the microprocessor is revolutionizing industrial society
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today by supplementing brain power with the near instantaneous
power of electronic computation. The results are already
apparent. Electronic banking, barcode scanning, personal
organizers, cellular car phones, telephones and modems on airline
seats, electronic town hall meetings, and teleconferencing are
among the developments that mark new ways in which people work,
govern, transact business, and teach. These powerful developments
are leading society toward an uncertain but interesting future; a
future which it is just beginning to explore. These same forces
acting on society are acting on our Army as well.
As exciting as all this may be, interesting times are
difficult times precisely because, unlike more stable periods,
the very uncertainty and turbulence that makes these periods
interesting also makes planning for the future very difficult.
Assumptions are less secure, objectives less well defined, and
the future utility of current means decidedly less certain. By
themselves, either the collapse of the Cold War strategic
paradigm, or the coming of the Information Age would have
presented the Army with a formidable task. As we contemplate not
only new missions but also new means, these events present us
with both an unprecedented challenge and an unparalleled
opportunity.
The two previous monographs in this series, War in the
Information Age and Land Warfare in the 21st Century, aimed at
identifying in general terms what future war and land combat in
this new environment is likely to portend. We are continuing to
gain insights into the conduct of operations in this new
environment. As we have conducted additional military operations,
continued to think about the challenges facing us, and engaged in
experimentation to test our ideas, several areas where we believe
the future will differ most from the past have come into focus.
This monograph will provide insights into three critical areas:
the operational environment; the emergence of simultaneity as the
unifying concept in Information Age warfare; and, changes in the
planning environment. The intent of this discussion is to further
the dialogue necessary for moving our profession into the 21st
century.
The Operational Environment.
Five trends will define the operational environment in
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Information Age warfare. These are:
•

Greater lethality and dispersion.

•

Increased volume and precision of fire.

• Better integrative technology leading to increased
efficiency and effectiveness.
• Increasing ability of smaller units to create decisive
results.
•

Greater invisibility and increased detectability.
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As these trends take hold, future operations will assume a
much different character than those of the past. To fully
appreciate the significance of this change, one must understand
the relationships underlying these trends as well as the
fundamental building blocks of operational power in this new
environment.
Operational forces generate their power from the interaction
of six elements. In the environment in which Force XXI will
operate, power will derive from the ability of a force to: sense
the enemy, itself and its environment; strike an opponent
decisively; protect itself from the attacks of the opponent; move
freely in the area of operations; exercise control over sub4
elements; and sustain itself. Each of these elements interacts
in dynamic fashion with the other elements to create the total
potential power of the force. For example, consider what is
principally a strike function: operational deep fires. To be
effective, deep fires must be accurate. Accuracy depends on the
ability to sense the target and exercise control over the timing
of the fires. Also, the effectiveness of these fires will depend
on the ability to move the strike means into position, protect
them both while en route and when in place, and to sustain the
strike means with ammunition and other supplies. Thus the
effectiveness of operational fires is a function not only of the
missile or the bomb itself, but also of the operational
commander's ability to sense, control, move, protect, and
sustain.

4

Maneuver is also a function of the same elements. Success
depends on the commander's ability to achieve effective
situational awareness; an accurate sensing of both enemy and
friendly forces in the area of operations. This sensing will lead
to an identification of enemy weakness in relation to friendly
strength, and the identification of areas from which positional
advantage can be attained. Controlled, protected, and sustainable
movement to these areas will then allow the commander to move the
enemy out of position or provide the maneuver forces with a more
favorable position from which to further strike the enemy. As
with operational fires, the success of operational maneuver is a
function of the combined effect of the same fundamental elements.
These fundamental elements are the first order forces at

5

work behind the five trends that are defining the operational
environment. These trends describe what is happening as a result
of the increasing strength of the individual elements of
operational power. For example, the trend towards greater
lethality and dispersion results from the increased power of the
sensing, striking, and controlling functions. Similarly, the
trend toward greater integrative capacity issues from vast
improvements in our ability to sense enemy forces and exercise
control over our operations. These elements are the dimensions of
the Information Age battlefield, blending traditional battlefield
functions and systems in a way that enables commanders to better
understand the complex dynamics required to achieve total
integration in space, time, and effects.
Understanding this interaction helps us to extend our
discussion to the theater level. Called on to compel, deter,
reassure, or support, at the theater level specific mission,
environmental, and situational factors, as well as specific enemy
forces, enter our calculations. At the theater level, we can
balance requirements with the capabilities required to achieve
success–decisive victory. The elements of operational power are a
useful framework within which to balance our ends with our means
under these specific conditions.
The nature of the operation which we are undertaking will
exert the greatest influence on the capabilities that we bring to
bear in the theater. Our aim–whether it is to compel a foe to do
our will, deter that foe from taking certain actions, reassure an
ally, or conduct support operations–will determine the character
of the operation. Once there is a clear understanding of the
mission and the environment, the elements of operational power
can guide our thinking through the development of a balanced
theater structure.
As an example consider planning an operation similar to the
one the Army undertook in Rwanda in the summer of 1994. The first
task would be to determine the nature of the operation. As in
Rwanda, the operation in this instance would be a humanitarian
support effort. The specifics of the environment might vary, but
in our planning the following would be considered: the magnitude
of the effort, size of the geographic area, available
infrastructure, climate and weather, and many other factors.
Based on the operational functions, this assessment would lead to
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a determination of the joint capabilities required to execute the
operation.

Control: The control capability could take the form of a
Joint Task Force (JTF) formed around a division, corps, or
unified command headquarters with the appropriate means required
to exert control over the forces deployed throughout the area of
operations. Our analysis of control would also extend to
determining the capabilities required to exert an appropriate
degree of control over the population and resources in the area.
Sense: Next, the planner could consider the sensing
capabilities that might be required. This could take the form of
Special Forces survey teams, aerial reconnaissance, or any of a
number of means designed to give the commander the capability to
sense both the environment and the progress of the relief effort.
Sustain: A relief operation such as the one we are outlining
would hinge on sustainment. As an element of operational power,
the sustainment function must be considered as it relates to our
forces. We would have to analyze the requirements and deploy the
capabilities necessary to meet our needs. Moreover, in this
operation sustainment considerations must also be considered
relative to what additional capabilities might be required to
execute the relief effort. This study would lead to a
determination of the capabilities required to store, transport,
and distribute the total required supplies as well as any
requirements for improvements to the existing infrastructure.
Move: The move function is closely linked to the sustainment
function in this operation. The planner would consider the
capabilities required to move relief supplies and equipment into
the area as well as within the area. Additionally, requirements
to move the forces executing the relief effort, as well as
requests from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), like the
International Red Cross, would have to be integrated and
balanced.
Protect: In relief operations like the one under
consideration, protection of the force seldom involves the
traditional measures needed to ward off the destructive effects
of an opposing enemy force. Rather, the planner has to consider a
broader and less easily defined combination of possible threats
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including disease, armed bands, and terrorists. If the relief
efforts are undertaken in an area torn by civil or clan warfare,
planners will need to consider the danger of attack by one or
more factions engaged in conflict with each other.

Strike: Under the conditions laid out above, the strike
function would be viewed in two distinct ways. First, it would be
considered in terms of the degree of coercive capability
necessary to support the execution of the mission. In this light,
it would entail an analysis of the capabilities required to guard
against theft, to establish order, to police the area, and
perhaps to neutralize armed bands. Viewed in another, and perhaps
more important way, the strike function would be defined by our
ability to mass effects (relief) at the critical times and places
we sense. Decisive victory would be defined by our ability to
coordinate "strikes" to stop the dying and stabilize the
situation for local government and NGOs.
The above discussion, although incomplete in many details,
illustrates a way of thinking about future operations. Tailoring
of capabilities to specific theater and mission requirements will
be the norm in war and Military Operations Other Than War.
Structuring our thinking in terms of the elements of operational
power will facilitate this process. We have to think not in terms
of how many brigades or divisions are needed, but in terms of
what we need in the theater to sense, strike, protect, and so on.
Additionally, thinking in this way allows us to consider more
precisely the functional relationships and their effect on power.
Thinking in these terms is particularly useful against a foe
with multidimensional capabilities. Combat power is a function of
the interaction of the six elements across the Joint Force. To
succeed in multidimensional warfare, we must exert relative
dominance over our opponent across functions and mediums in the
theater of war. This dominance is the result of the total power
generated by the entire set of friendly capabilities in relation
to that which an enemy can bring to bear against us.
Spatial-Temporal Dimension in Future Warfare.
The goal is to be able to wield military power across space
and through time with heretofore unimaginable precision and
accuracy. We aim at the integration of the entire force's
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capabilities in a way resembling the effects of a single weapon.
That is, we are striving for an unprecedented ability to
synchronize multiple capabilities, from multiple services in
time, space, and direction. If we can attain this ideal, the Army
will have achieved the capability to conduct operations in a
qualitatively different way. Commanders will be able to link
joint sensors, with joint strike and protection means, into a
protected and sustainable seamless entity whose elements are able
to interact with each other effortlessly to deliver devastatingly
accurate effects. This is our vision of the joint context in
which Force XXI will operate.
The model shown below depicts this ideal. It illustrates the
combined strike means of the Joint Force being employed in a
synchronized and precise way against a specific enemy capability;
in this case, a critical control node in the enemy's air arm. The
same idea could be applied to the employment of sensing means,
either in the broad band across the entire enemy force, or in a
narrow band aimed precisely at a particular capability. The value
of this kind of approach should be obvious; precision of this
nature will enable us to destroy the coherence of the enemy force
by taking away the lynch pins that hold it together.
In the macro
provide the means
analysis. One can
relationship in a

sense, the elements of operational power also
to conduct a capabilities-based tradeoff
ask questions such as, "What is the optimum
theater force structure between strike and
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sensing means?" Or, "What is the best mix of theater mobility
assets and protection means?" As part of the first question, it
is important to remember that the greater our capability to
sense, the more effectively the enemy can be struck. But, at some
point deploying greater sensing capabilities adds little
capability at the margin. As a part of the latter question, we
need to understand that every theater will be different in terms
of mobility requirements and that every threat will present
unique challenges in terms of our ability to provide protection
for the force. Additionally, one must recognize the temporal
variable. The relative importance of each function will vary over
time as capabilities are sequenced into the theater.

Simultaneity.
Since the Civil War, military strategists have understood
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that strategic decision in a theater of war comes as the result
of success in a series of linked operations. These operations,
each sequential in nature, are combined in effect to destroy the
enemy's capacity or will to resist. The Civil War, both World
Wars, and the Korean War offer examples of this method. But this
approach to securing strategic decision has not always been the
norm. Throughout much of history strategic decision could be
achieved by attaining success in one great climactic battle.
As war became the endeavor of the industrialized nationstate, the size of armies grew and so did the frontages over
which their operations were conducted. These frontages were wide,
but very narrow in the depth that could be influenced by the
weapons of each opponent. The occasional cavalry raid or partisan
action notwithstanding, throughout the entire 19th century the
"reach" of opposing forces was limited to the range of their
largest weapon–the cannon. Armies could sense and strike each
other only as far as they could see and bring artillery fire to
bear. Because reserves could operate just beyond the range of
reliable detection and out of the range of artillery fire,
reserve forces could not be attacked and fixed in position. The
result was that armies had near-total freedom of movement in
their rear areas. This circumstance, exploited by the rapid
lateral movement made possible by railroads, meant that a
breakthrough could be countered more rapidly than it could be
5
exploited. Thus, throughout World War I operation after
6
operation came to a halt after gaining only a few kilometers.
Beginning in World War II, the airplane extended the range
of artillery to operational and strategic depths. For the first
time in warfare, freedom of movement behind the front was
seriously hampered. Bridges could be bombed, railroad yards
destroyed, and operational reserves delayed or disrupted. Aerial
interdiction brought legitimacy to war in the third dimension.
Although the means employed were undeveloped and unbalanced, the
concept of attacking the enemy throughout the breadth and depth
7
of the operational area was in place by 1945.
During the Cold War the concept of simultaneous attack
throughout the entire breadth and depth of the theater was
developed and extended. This effort matured in 1982 with the
development of AirLand Battle doctrine by the U.S. Army. The
initial AirLand Battle doctrine and its subsequent refinement in
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1986, along with the complementary NATO concept of Follow-On
Forces Attack (FOFA), drove operational requirements to extend
the battlefield in terms of depth and time–spatially and
temporally. But having the ability to strike deep was not enough.
What has been needed, and what can now be achieved, is a
qualitatively different way of fighting–the ability not only to
strike the enemy deep, but to see the enemy deep in real time.
With this capability, commanders can now blend previously
separate and discrete operations into a single and seamless
whole.
This was the genesis of the idea which is now developing
into its full promise: Theater-Strategic Operations. This
involves the design and execution of a theater-wide effort to
bring strategic decision in a single operation by inflicting
simultaneous tactical, operational, and strategic paralysis on an
enemy in order to bring about rapid and total collapse of
resistance.
As became evident during Operation Urgent Fury in Panama in
1989, overwhelming the enemy simultaneously at the operational
and tactical levels neutralizes his ability to react. Strategic
collapse quickly follows. Simultaneity, applied across the Joint
force is the ultimate force multiplier. Sequential operations
simply cannot achieve the synergistic impact that simultaneity
offers. The simultaneous use of force enables Joint forces to
achieve their objectives quickly, establishing control and
imposing their will on any given situation by controlling the
operational tempo to bring about order in a chaotic environment.
All of this can be achieved with minimum loss of life on either
side and minimum destruction of resources and infrastructure.
Simultaneity, the simultaneous employment of overwhelming
combat power throughout the breadth and depth of the operational
area to paralyze the enemy, is the defining characteristic of war
and Military Operations Other Than War in the Information Age.
Operation Just Cause and the maneuver phase of Operation Desert
Storm were both examples of a Theater-Strategic Operation. Had
the negotiations failed to bring about a peaceful transition of
power in Haiti, that kind of operation would have taken place
there as well.
In these operations, we received a glimpse of the leveraging
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effect of simultaneous action. Such leverage is the result of the
application of simultaneity in three different dimensions: in
time, over time, and throughout the levels of war. Simultaneity
in time refers to the conduct of multiple actions at the same
time. Such action has the effect of overwhelming an opponent's
capacity for effective action by simultaneously presenting him
with multiple threats. It directly strikes at his freedom of
action by attacking and immobilizing multiple parts at the same
time. This is analogous to a police technique for subduing a
suspect. Three officers simultaneously rush the offending party,
one grabbing the legs while the other two each grab an arm. This
quickly overwhelms the target, causing minimum damage to all
concerned. Compare this with a sequential use of force where one
police officer at a time goes after the same suspect. In this
case the suspect would eventually be subdued, but in the process
both he and each policeman would be the worse for the exchange.
Simultaneity over time is linked to both the nature of
surprise and the decision cycle of the opponent. Surprise can be
looked at as being either cognitive or physical. Cognitive
surprise occurs when the target of the surprise is totally
unaware of the action that befalls him. That is, the enemy has no
idea that something will happen until it does. Physical surprise
is different. The target may know that something is about to
happen, but he is physically unable to do anything about it. The
effect of both types of surprise is the same. The target becomes
incapable of effective response. If the target cannot recover the
ability to take effective action, the effect of the initial
surprise will be decisive.
Considering the decision cycle of the target–its ability to
cycle among observation, orientation, decision, and action–it is
obvious that when the attacking force achieves surprise, the
opponent is faced with a situation that he has either not seen
coming, or is not oriented to block. However, at the moment of
attack the target begins a new cycle. If opposing forces can be
confronted with another action before they can act to cope with
the first, then the power of simultaneity over time becomes
evident.
To the target, the new action is for all practical purposes
simultaneous to the initial action. This type of action conducted
on a continuous basis magnifies the effect of the initial
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surprise. It precludes the enemy from regaining its balance by
presenting ememy forces with a continuous array of actions, each
of which precludes them from taking effective action against a
previous threat. If we strike an opponent a blow to the head to
stun and in rapid succession strike the chest, stomach, and
groin, the attack takes on an indiscernible unity in the eyes of
our opponent.
Simultaneity throughout the levels of war aims at the
simultaneous paralysis of action at the strategic, operational,
and tactical levels. Historically, we have thought in terms of
tactical success leading to operational success and operational
success leading to strategic success. Paradoxically perhaps, we
have also understood that the strategic level of war sets the
conditions for the operational level, which in turn sets the
conditions for the tactical. For example, if through a successful
operational concentration of force we can achieve a tactical
advantage of 20:1 over a foe at the point of attack, then no
degree of tactical excellence on the enemy's part is likely to
overcome this disadvantage. In such a case, operational level
actions will almost predetermine tactical success. Similarly, for
good or ill, strategic action can have the same effect on the
operational level.
Conceptually, by striking the enemy simultaneously at all
levels, its ability to salvage a situation is severely hampered.
The enemy is denied the flexibility to take operational action to
recover from tactical failure and the ability to take strategic
action to recover from operational defeat. In this manner the
linkages between the three levels of war are broken, making each
irrelevant to the other. The Gulf War provided a vision of the
advantage to be accrued from such a decoupling. First, on the
strategic level, even as American and Allied forces were building
up in the Persian Gulf region, Washington isolated Baghdad
diplomatically from its traditional allies and economically from
its sources of external income. Then, before Iraq could recover
from this strategic diplomatic and economic action, Allied forces
8
launched the first phase of Operation Desert Storm. The air
operation accomplished two tasks. First, it fixed the Iraqis in
Kuwait by taking away their ability to conduct operational-level
movements. Second, through continued strategic attacks directed
against Iraqi infrastructure, command centers, and industry, the
Iraqis were kept off balance strategically–even when they began
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their series of SCUD attacks in an attempt to regain the
initiative. These attacks made it impossible for the Iraqi
leadership to exercise positive operational direction over their
forces deployed in Kuwait as well as over many elements
throughout Iraq. Consequently, Iraqi forces were incapable of any
coordinated response to the attacking ground forces when the
final, decisive phase of the war began on February 24, 1991.
Localized, uncoordinated tactical responses were the extent of
Iraqi military actions after the actual shooting began. In this
fashion, through a series of sequential and simultaneous multilevel actions, the Allied forces achieved the effect of
simultaneity over the Iraqis at all levels of war.
In the future, improvements in the ability to sense,
control, and strike at ever increasing ranges with ever
increasing accuracy and lethality will add further impact to
simultaneous action. Moreover, the power of simultaneity can be
seen across a wide spectrum of conflict. In support operations,
simultaneous action can bring needed assistance throughout the
affected area rapidly, thereby saving lives. If the objective is
compellance, the ability to disconnect the enemy's strategic,
operational, and tactical efforts from each other holds the
promise of quick and decisive results at lower costs. Just as the
climactic battle yielded to the need to conduct sequential
operations in the Industrial Age, the Information Age is
providing us the technologies and weapons needed to replace
sequential operations with the overwhelming simultaneous theater
operation.
The Planning Environment.
For the foreseeable future the planning environment is
likely to be dominated by general assumptions and unquantifiable
threats; an unsettling environment for any organization. For the
U.S. Army, which must prepare to advance national interests in
new, different, and perhaps unforeseen ways, the prospect is
truly formidable. A sports analogy, though not entirely adequate,
9
can illustrate the problem.
During the Cold War the U.S. Army was like a football team,
preparing for a game which coaches, players, and fans hoped would
never take place. The opponent was bigger and had a deeper bench,
but the U.S Army was quicker, sufficiently powerful, and perhaps
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smarter. The Army also knew many other things. It understood the
rules of the game. It knew the locations of the major stadiums
and the field conditions at each of these locations. It had a
good idea of its opponent's plays and probable game plans. And it
had analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the opponent and had
developed specific game plans to counter each strength and
exploit each weakness. This knowledge allowed the U.S Army to
organize itself confidently, plan for the contest, and practice
specifically for the big game under whatever circumstances it
might be played.
The Army was ready for the whistle to blow. It may not have
known precisely when or where it would play, but coaches,
players, and fans knew that the game would be football. Today the
team and the coaches are unsure of whether they will be playing
football, baseball, or soccer–or some combination of these or any
number of other games. Furthermore, many of the potential
opponents have no commitment to playing by any rules other than
their own. Desert Storm, Somalia, Hurricane Andrew, Rwanda, and
Haiti are each as different from the other as baseball is
different from football and as legitimate sport is different from
a free-for-all.
As the Army moves into the next century, uncertainty will be
the norm and not the exception. Under conditions of relative
certainty, such as the Cold War environment, the Army could
optimize for a particular type of conflict. Under the more
uncertain conditions of today, we must structure for maximum
flexibility. When we knew where we were going to fight, against
whom, and for approximately how long, the Army organized its
forces precisely to meet those conditions. Units trained
according to very precise Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs)
under very precise conditions and command relationships. Today we
cannot make those precise assumptions, and we must structure to
meet a wider range of requirements. Structuring for this wider
range is a much greater challenge than structuring for a narrower
set of conditions.
The challenge today is to minimize the inherent problems
that come with the requirement for greater flexibility. The days
of structuring and planning solely against a known threat are not
likely to return soon. Now the challenge is to determine what
array of capabilities may be needed to perform a broader range of
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requirements. It is equally important to determine how much of
each capability Force XXI may need and how it should best
organize these capabilities. For example, will the Army structure
a division or brigade to be multifunctional across a broad range
of mission areas on a permanent basis? Or, would it be better to
structure these headquarters so that a wide array of units with
specific capabilities can be integrated on a temporary and
mission-specific basis?
Other equally important questions must be addressed as the
Army transitions to a capabilities-based force. How many echelons
of command will be needed? Today, from squad to corps we have
seven echelons. At what level can the Army most effectively
organize and train for functional competency? At what level
should capabilities be mixed? Which capabilities should be
included in the Active and Reserve Components? These are
difficult questions to which there are no easy answers. But these
are precisely the type of questions that have to be addressed.
Moreover, every question will have to be considered within
the framework of the Joint environment. Just like the days of
structuring and planning against a known threat are over, so too
are the days when individual services could structure without
considering the capabilities that other services bring to the
fight. This is another reason why the operational power model is
so useful–it helps us to think in terms of functions that need to
be performed across mediums, rather than in terms of individual
service capabilities.
The answers will not come overnight. The Army EXFOR
(Experimental Force) at Ft. Hood, Texas and other service and
Joint tests will assist us in finding the answers to many of
these questions. Through a commitment to finding the best
solution and an iterative process of hypothesis and
experimentation, the Armed Forces will go far in minimizing the
tradeoff between flexibility and efficiency that comes with
designing a force capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st
century.
Conclusion.
Anticipating the future is an imprecise endeavor.
Nevertheless, it is imperative that we look forward, not
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backward. Only by anticipating the requirements can the Army
expect to position itself as a relevant force in the future.
History is the only reliable source we have for analyzing how
previous armies anticipated change, and the pages of history
books are replete with armies that failed to do so. For the
nations unfortunate enough to have relied on these armies, the
cost of not being prepared was high–sometimes catastrophically
so.
The reason that many armies have failed to change with the
conditions is that armies are by nature conservative
institutions, generally resistant to change. This institutional
resistance is particularly dangerous in times of historical
transformation when a paradigm shift is evident. It is precisely
then that the most rapid organizational response is needed. One
of the most difficult, but also most essential tasks confronting
a military establishment is the acceptance and development of
bold new ideas. This is particularly true in military
institutions which have recently experienced significant military
successes, as the U.S. Army has in the Persian Gulf and in Haiti.
Ideas that have the potential to overturn long-established,
bureaucratically entrenched methods of operation are not welcomed
by the average man. When the paradigm shifts, most cannot grasp
the full potential of new ideas. New technologies and processes
can frighten those who are comfortable with the routines
established to accommodate the old technologies. Furthermore,
vested interests within the organization and within its
bureaucracy–usually for what to them are good and logical
reasons–will resist ideas that threaten the status quo.
Bureaucracies flourish on procedures instituted to insure
efficiency. Innovation is the enemy of efficiency because it
threatens established procedures. This is a mindset that we
cannot afford in Force XXI. While military professionals must
hold the security of the nation as something with which they dare
not gamble, they cannot afford to discourage the kind of
imagination and innovation that is needed to meet the varied
challenges that will arise in the 21st century.
History can be a help. Consider the struggle within the Navy
for carrier aviation. Prior to its development, the existing
naval paradigm held that decisive victory at sea depended upon
capital ships engaging with cannon at visual range. Shortly
before World War I, tests and demonstrations were conducted which
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established that aircraft could be launched from vessels at sea
and that these planes could drop bombs with a degree of accuracy.
The use of aircraft at sea presaged an alternative approach to
the conduct of naval warfare. Throughout the inter-war period, a
generation of naval officers worked to perfect the ideas and
concepts for carrier warfare. Theory led practice because, until
the 1930s, airplanes simply did not have the power to take off
from the deck of a carrier while carrying enough ordnance to
seriously damage a modern battleship. Army Air Services Colonel
Billy Mitchell had shown that land-based aviation could do it,
but his twin-engine bombers carried 1,100 pound demolition bombs
10
and took off from large, grass and earth fields. However,
technology caught up with the concept. Better communications,
more powerful airplanes, and larger aircraft carriers provided
the means to realize the theory.
Concurrently, through gaming conducted at the Naval War
College in Newport, Rhode Island, and in exercises conducted at
sea, a doctrine of naval air power gradually evolved. This was
so not only in the United States but also in Japan, England, and
Italy. In the United States and England this was accomplished in
a period of extreme budgetary constraints and against the
opposition of a significant faction in each country's naval
establishment who believed that scarce resources could better be
spent elsewhere. Had these defenders of the status quo won the
day over the proponents of innovation and change, the subsequent
war in the Pacific may have turned out very differently for the
United States. That the establishment reacted in this way is even
more remarkable when one considers that when the admirals and
captains of 1925 were ensigns and junior lieutenants, their
senior officers had been in the Navy when there was a similar
paradigm shift from wooden hulls and sail to steel hulls and
steam power.
The Second World War, Pearl Harbor and Midway in particular,
convincingly proved the validity of carrier power and changed
entrenched notions about naval warfare. By the end of the war the
aircraft carrier had replaced the battleship as the Navy's prime
capital ship and another paradigm shift had taken place. The
historical method of waging naval warfare, gunnery duels at
visual range, gave way to engagements well over the horizon. In
essence, naval commanders came to understand that the aircraft
was more than just a long-range cannon, and that against an
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integrated fleet no battleship stood a chance. Once this
understanding took hold, the carrier became the dominant naval
platform around which organizations and tactics were designed. A
new paradigm was born.
Clearly there are forces at work today which will have
consequences that military professionals need to anticipate. The
purpose of this monograph has been to identify these forces and
to suggest some of their consequences and how these might affect
the operational environment, the structure of the Army, and the
way we plan and conduct operations. While we live in a rapidly
changing world, institutional change moves slowly. Just as the
fully developed carrier concept matured over 40 years, so too
will our force of the future grow, evolve and change. For two
decades the Army has pioneered information-based systems. Now it
is evident that information and knowledge based systems,
organizations, and operations will change fundamentally the way
the Army fights. While the precise manner in which this will
happen may not be entirely clear, the one thing that is sure is
that Information Age technologies will have a profound effect on
land warfare in the 21st century.
In 1925, only the most convinced "true believers" in shipborne air power could have imagined what impact their ideas would
eventually have. They did not know precisely what equipment they
would need or how their ideas would alter institutional
organizations or the tactics of naval warfare. Yet they
persevered despite tight budgets and internal opposition. Had
they not done so it would have been clear, by the summer of 1942,
with a fleet of Japanese aircraft carriers bearing down on
Midway, just how much risk an institution and a nation can incur
by discouraging and fighting change.
Today, America's Army is in a similar position. The world
has changed and there is great risk in standing still.
Information Age technology has advanced to the point that some
can begin to see the potential that new tools will have in the
way military operations are conducted. Through the lenses of
experiments, such as the Synthetic Theater of War (STOW) and
Advanced Warfare Experiments (AWEs), glimpses of what could be
are apparent even if no one is yet able to specify exactly where
all this will lead. Like those brave pioneers who developed naval
aviation, we will test the validity of our concept and
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continuously refine the application despite the opposition of the
keepers of the intellectual status quo. We have a vision and a
plan to grow into that vision. Keeping in mind that it took the
Navy a generation until the idea of carrier-borne air power
became fact, we should not expect full, fast, and precise
solutions to all the challenges facing us today. But be very sure
that America's Army will meet these challenges.
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